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Elisabeth Schimpfössl
Coercion or Conformism? Censorship and self-
censorship among Russian media personalities and
reporters in the 2010s
Federal television is a crucial element of the political system in Putin’s Russia. 88% of the Russian
population use television news as their prime source of information, 65% regard the news reporting as
objective and 51% trust television as an information source.[1] Television is, therefore, the primary and
most effective tool employed by the political regime to influence its people. Since the onset of the
Ukraine conflict and more hostile relations between Russia and the West, Russia’s main television
channels have confounded the world with their ability to convince viewers of stories which are
diametrically opposed to those shown in the West. What the Russian viewers see on state-aligned
television is strongly shaped by the Kremlin. Particularly during Putin’s third presidential term, news
reporting has become more propagandistic.[2]
Co-author: Ilya Yablokov
This is an updated version of an article published in Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet
Democratization, 22/2, 2014, 295-311. It will be republished in a special issue edited by Marlene Laruelle
and Peter Rollberg on ‘Media in Eurasia’ in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.
This media environment is commonly attributed to the regime’s desire to control, censor and promote its
agenda. If not overt political censorship, then it must be at least self-censorship that muffles any voice
critical of Putin’s activities in eastern Ukraine or that stifles more progressive societal attitudes towards
homosexuality in the country. We claim that the idea that images broadcast by Russian television are
initiated by the Presidential Administration and imposed coercively onto reporters is too simple and, in
many respects, inaccurate. We strive to shed a more nuanced and multi-faceted account of the
functioning of self-censorship. Often without being told what to do, journalists, reporters and television
hosts are usually very keen to ‘get it right’ and do what they think that the authorities want them to do.
Yet at the same time they are also individuals with their own characters and ideas. This article will
explore processes around media governance on federal television channels in Putin’s third presidential
term, in particular the question of self-censorship among presenters, reporters and media personalities. It
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will discuss the ways in which the media adapts how news is made and framed to comply with the
expectations of authorities. It will make comparisons between renowned media personalities and less or
little known “rank-and-file” reporters.
Questions around censorship and self-censorship are very familiar to Russian reporters[3] and have
attracted a fair degree of academic attention, especially from social scientists working on Ukraine and
Central Asia.[4] As Sarah Oates concluded from her study of the television coverage of Russian
elections, reporters chose to adjust the message their reports deliver to the position of their political
masters.[5] Censorship, the outright prohibition, alteration or suppression of thoughts in media outlets or
other forms of public expression, is usually linked to coercive tactics imposed upon those not complying.
Self-censorship implies a self-inflicted restriction of free expression, also arising from subordination to
the political interests as well as fear of superiors.[6]
We argue that many reporters act out of conformism. This is a difficult notion, as it can mean both
opportunism and conformism which has become routinized, but was originally linked to coercion. The
latter case was typical for the Soviet Union; first, coercion forced reporters and public activists to
suppress their thoughts, which, later, became the silently accepted norm of behavior to get by without
trouble. We conceptualise these self-censorship practices in terms of “adekvatnost’”, a unique position
which produces journalism that corresponds to the authorities’ expectations (thereby freeing them from
the need to exert explicit censorship) and yet at the same time does not limit a journalist’s
creativity. “Adekvatnost’” is almost identical to self-censorship, but not perceived as such by the
journalists who apply it as they consider it to be a professional virtue. The term “adekvatnost’”, which was
used by a number of our incognito reporters, appeared to combine the two differing concepts of
conformism.
The issue of conformism in news making was studied by Olessia Koltsova. Among other things, she
analyzed the role of censorship and self-censorship in the day-to-day practices of Russian journalists, as
well as how they conformed to their superiors’ wishes. According to Koltsova’s study, rank-and-file
journalists in the mid-2000s were not particularly interested in the political aspects of their management’s
decision making. They would have agreed anyway, which gave them leeway to express their own
thoughts.[7]
With regard to self-censorship, we will draw on Koltsova’ News Media and Power in Russia. However, we
will shift the focus from local channels examined in her study to Russia’s federal television channels. In
Putin’s third presidential term, massive changes have taken place in the television landscape. Close
examination of current reporters will allow us to determine whether self-censorship has remained one of
the most significant elements of media governance.
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This article challenges the view that self-censorship, if understood as a concept based on fear, is the
main regulator in Russian media governance. Conversely, this article argues that media personalities
and reporters on Russian federal television channels do have the options to avoid reporting news which
contradicts their own political convictions. Those media personalities and reporters who work in positions
which involve direct promotion of Kremlin positions have usually chosen to do so, and do it deliberately.
Methodology and empirical data
We were particularly interested in whether Russian media governance is based on coercion or whether
media personalities and reporters primarily conform to the ideas and values promoted by the current
regime. To learn more about how media personalities and reporters perceive policies imposed by their
editors and how they assess their own role, we conducted interviews with renowned media personalities
as well as “ordinary” reporters.
We attempted to interview reporters, presenters and anchors from the widest possible political spectrum
covered by the federal television channels. Those opposed to the Putin regime who have openly raised
issues of censorship were excluded, as their opinion is publicly available. Instead, we were keen to
interview reporters, presenters and anchors affiliated to state-aligned television who do not usually talk
about issues of censorship and self-censorship. Also, we sought to find interviewees at different stages
of their careers and on different hierarchical levels. We eventually conducted interviews with 13 media
personalities and reporters between January and August 2013 in Moscow. 8 have been used for this
analysis; 4 famous media personalities and 4 rank-and-file reporters. These were chosen in order to
represent an even spread within the ranks of the broadcasting companies. We were therefore afforded
the opportunity to analyze, at two different levels, how these individuals assess self-censorship.
The four famous media personalities (Dmitrii Kiselev/then Rossiia, later appointed by Putin as head of
Rossiia Segodnia), Arkadii Mamontov/Rossiia, Maksim Shevchenko/Channel 1 and Anton
Krasovskii/formerly NTV) allowed us to use their real names. These four individuals represent a relatively
wide political spectrum, from deeply conservative to relatively liberal, both in a political and economic
sense. Given their present or past affiliation with the Kremlin, we need to take into consideration that
their responses could be toeing the line.
The second set of interviewees consists of relatively unknown reporters who work for important prime-
time news programs on major television channels. Channel 1 is Russia’s main television channel,
commanding 14.4% market share, 75% of which is controlled by the state. Rossiia, the second most
popular television channel with 13.2% market share, is part of the state-owned media holding VGTRK
(All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company). NTV and REN TV are privately owned
television channels with audience shares of 12.1% and 5.2% respectively. The main shareholders enjoy
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close links to the Kremlin. Overall, these four channels cover 44.9% of all Russian television viewers.[8]
In these interviews we focused on more technical questions related to everyday journalistic practices and
procedures; how agendas are set, how decision-making mechanisms operate, and how hiring practices
work. Except for one case (the REN TV reporter), our incognito reporters represent the same channels
as the renowned media personalities mentioned previously. However, they are at the lower end of the
internal company hierarchies. This allowed us to gain an insight into two different levels of media
governance and editorial hierarchies. These interviewees preferred to remain anonymous.
In our analysis, we have focused on the media personalities’ and reporters’ career trajectories, political
views and the power relations expressed in their narratives, both between them and media authorities,
as well as between them and their audience. Our aim was to reconstruct contemporary television
governance based on our interview analysis and the collected narratives set within the context of openly
available information including academic analyses.
We will first discuss the responses given by our four well-known interviewees regarding censorship and
self-censorship. Thereafter we will look into the narratives and self-perception of the incognito reporters.
These two sets of interviews are used as the basis for our main argument that media personalities and
reporters perceive self-censorship in contemporary Russia under Putin’s third term as being; first,
deliberately applied, i.e. out of conviction and, second, free of coercion. Hence, the conclusion drawn
from their narratives is hat, contrary to the widely held idea that they are repressed individuals; they in
fact have sufficient opportunities to choose not to write or articulate things they disagree with.
Renowned media personalities: Career trajectories, political views and censorship
The famous media personalities enjoy their celebrity status for different reasons; they are characters,
often sharp, witty, provocative and non-conformist. The television channels’ need to keep ratings up
means that management has to give in to the occasionally complex, vain and erratic nature of their most
famous television hosts, pundits and anchors, whose showmanship and occasionally radical views are
crucial for keeping the audience entertained, and viewer ratings up. Hence, notwithstanding the state’s
attempt at stricter media control, consumers of state-aligned television can still enjoy listening to a broad
range of politically provocative and unorthodox ideas. At the same time it is absolutely clear to these
individuals who has the final say and to whom they have to subordinate. Since the start of Putin’s third
presidency it has become more difficult to balance these dichotomies.
Career trajectories
Dmitrii Kiselev (Rossiia) was appointed by Putin as the head of the state-owned news agency Rossiia
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Segodnia in December 2013. Until 2012 he acted as the deputy director of the state-owned media
holding VGTRK. At the time of the interview in March 2012 he was author and presenter of Vesti Nedeli,
the second most popular weekly Sunday news program.
Arkadii Mamontov from the Rossiia channel is the author and host of the talk show Spetsial’nyi
Korrespondent. The show raises topical and controversial political issues. Their aim is to endear the
public to the Kremlin. The experts and guest speakers are chosen in order to provoke heated
discussions. A number of Mamontov’s shows even caused diplomatic scandals.[9]
Maksim Shevchenko (Channel 1) is the former host of the talk shows Sudite Sami and V kontekste. He
became acclaimed for his sharp and witty discussion style in Sudite Sami. Shevchenko’s public activities
extend to political activism. For example, he took part in election campaigns supporting Kremlin-loyal
politicians.[10]
Anton Krasovskii was formerly presenter on the Kremlin-sponsored online channel Kontr TV. Prior to
this, he worked on NTV from 2010 to 2012 as editor and host of the popular talk show NTVshniki which
discussed current political affairs and was closed down in summer 2012. Following this and prior to his
post at Kontr TV, Krasovskii made a name for himself as a presenter on NTV and briefly as a campaign
manager of the oligarch and 2012 presidential candidate, Mikhail Prokhorov. Lately, Krasovskii has
published articles in The Guardian and other Western European newspapers on homophobia in Russia.
Political views
These four media personalities are, or at least used to be, loyal to the government. They act as
executors of state policies. Despite their loyalty to the Kremlin, they are also bold and vain characters.
Kiselev is a militant defender of the Putin regime. In 2013 he termed the growing “Islamic threat” one of
his personal priority topics.[11] In the 1990s Kiselev was a strong advocate of liberal views and
unconditionally defended the rights of the Fourth Estate. His program Okno v Evropu (Window onto
Europe) promoted a cosmopolitan view of the world. In a discussion in 1999, Kiselev claimed that a
reporter has no right to be a propagandist.[12] Since then his position has taken a U-turn and he now
considers it to be one of a reporter’s primary tasks to produce new values, educate the Russian people
and establish new norms.
Mamontov is as radical in his patriotic conservatism as Kiselev. He is notorious for his radical-
conservative views, in particular in relation to migrants, and his crude approach to journalism. One
reporter we talked to called him “a symbol of propaganda.”[13] Mamontov became famous as a war
reporter on NTV in the 1990s, a time when the formerly liberal news channel was known for its critical
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coverage of the military conflict in Chechnya. His stance changed in 2000 after he joined the state-
owned VGTRK; from being critical of the regime to being highly critical of Russia’s “enemies” both within
and outside the country. In the 2000s he began to play a major role, on behalf of the Kremlin, in
triggering events which resulted in the justification for the repression of political oppositionists. [14]
A common reference point for these two media personalities is the first post-Soviet decade. They look at
the 1990s resentfully. Mamontov remembered: “1993 [when El’tsin crushed the parliament by force] had
great influence on me. I was in the White House [the parliament] and saw everything. I began to
understand that they betrayed us. They were not democrats, but swindlers, who plundered my country
pretending to be democrats. They looted it and carried the money to the West. 80% of my country thinks
like this.”[15] Also the former liberal Kiselev looks back at the 1990s as a dark decade and highly
approves of Putin’s turn to anti-liberalism: “We can’t rely on Western liberalism… By 2000 Russia was
close to falling apart. Entire regions did not pay taxes, we had a war and one region after the other
declared their independence from Moscow. Putin put everything back together, found the political will and
saved the country.”[16] The U-turn these two media personalities made, from being staunch liberals to
anti-liberals, probably partly explains the ferociousness of their present stance. However, this does not
mean that their former liberal outlook was any less conformist than their new anti-liberal outlook. In the
1990s it was fashionable to be a liberal and today it is fashionable to be an anti-liberal.
In contrast to Mamontov and Kiselev, Shevchenko represents a later generation of pro-Kremlin pundits.
His generation of media personalities did not go through a transformation from liberal to conservative,
but was formed by the Putin administration in the 2000s. As public intellectuals of the new millennium,
representatives of this generation articulated the various ideological concepts which the presidential
administration had developed. In addition to that, they went along with the policy changes the
presidential administration undertook. Despite this, ironically, these younger media personalities enjoy
more legitimacy both in public and in journalistic circles. Contrary to the older generation they never
collaborated with the El’tsin regime, which became increasingly discredited in the late 2000s, often also
by those who supported it back in the 1990s. The older generation had entered into a treaty with the
“devil” when supporting El’tsin’s presidential campaign by participating in the propaganda campaign
which led to his re-election in 1996.[17] The fact that Shevchenko was not involved in it makes his
criticism of Russia’s neoliberalism and the pro-Western attitudes, which the political establishment of the
1990s advocated, more credible.
Being popular for his provocative statements and sharp criticism of the West, Shevchenko combines
contradictory views in a blend which polarizes and at the same attracts audiences, ensuring his
popularity. He entertains his audiences with provocative political statements which oscillate between the
left and the far right. As he explained in the interview with us and often states publicly, Shevchenko
favors a strong state which opposes the West.[18] He advocates a return to some socialist elements in
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education. He justifies Stalin’s terror, as well as the Soviet campaigns against Jews, and identifies with,
for example, Austria’s right-wing on the issue of immigration.[19]
Shevchenko frequently presents himself as standing in opposition to the regime, which in occasional
statements he lets slip consists of bureaucrats and criminals. In one interview he even demanded that
the authorities should not treat political prisoners too harshly.[20] Nevertheless, he is considered to be
very loyal to the Kremlin. Paradoxically, this apparent inconsistency makes him extremely useful as an
official media personality. Political flexibility and the ability to quickly adapt his political identity to the
regime’s changing line, afford Shevchenko the opportunity to always stay within the bounds of what the
authorities consider acceptable. For this reason he enjoys far more freedom and leeway to make critical
statements against the regime than many of his colleagues.
Anton Krasovskii was the only media celebrity who did not toe the Kremlin line. Only a few weeks prior to
our interview he had lost his job on Kontr TV for announcing live on screen that he is gay. Like
Shevchenko, Krasovskii represents the post-2000 generation. Many of them are extremely cynical about
the current state of affairs in the country and lack general trust in democracy, including the democratic
demands which the opposition movement put forward. “Like Stolypin, my aim is a Great Russia. The
liberals aim at destroying and looting Russia. Nobody can change my opinion. I know many of them
[liberal opposition] personally. They are not the best people. Any average member of Putin’s United
Russia [Edinaia Rossiia] is much closer to me than any Aleksei Navalny,” Krasovskii argues.[21] Despite
being banned from work on state-aligned television in Russia because of his public criticism of the
authorities, Krasovskii still approves of the current regime and sharply criticizes any Russian opposition
movement.[22]
Views on censorship
In his prominent position, Kiselev is as much censor as the censored: “I write my own texts and nobody
reads them in advance, i.e. there is no censorship whatsoever.”[23] In the interview with us, he stressed
freedom of opinion and diversity as being important aspects of his Sunday weekly news bulletin on
Rossiia: “Our reporters represent a wide range of views and political opinions. We have conservatives,
and we have liberals. I am myself an enlightened conservative, a moderate conservative.”[24] Kiselev’s
level of tolerance of political diversity is straightforward: it ends where political views depart from those
endorsed by the current regime and, in particular, Putin. The rational here is simple and clear; every
reporter who is opposed to the government should find a medium not financed by the government to
work for. Due to his powerful position in the media hierarchy, Kiselev influences how information policies
are shaped: “In general, being a well-known reporter, I make politics. I am in a strong position to do
so.”[25]
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However, Kiselev sees his role far beyond the task of news making: “I act as God, as Jesus Christ. On
television I have a role of the creator. This is not because I want it. This is because only 20 years have
passed since the end of the Soviet era. References to the West often serve to legitimize this missionary
vocation: ‘If English reporters found themselves in such a situation, they would have done the same [as
us]. 100%. We are obliged to colonize our own country, and the English are excellent colonizers. They
imposed their values in many parts of the world.”[26] Here, references to the West serve to legitimize the
missionary vocation.
In sharp contrast to Kiselev, Mamontov named the lack of freedom of speech as one of the most
pressing issues in Russia today: “We need freedom of speech as much as we need air to breath. We
need it to be able to talk about corruption. To uncover it and to talk about it. We need to be able to say
who is a crook and who is a thief.”[27] However, this cannot be interpreted as an expression of criticism
of the current media governance.[28] Instead, Mamontov cleverly turns the tables. He takes up burning
issues which have been frequently raised by the opposition movement, such as corruption, migration
policies and widening social inequality in the country. He then flips them to support his own agenda,
thereby neutralizing the opposition.
Mamontov’s framing of the origins of self-censorship shows a certain cunning. Being an important actor
of Kremlin media policies, he does admit that there is self-censorship, something everybody suspects
anyway. However, he does not point a finger at the government, or the media elite, for why censorship
and self-censorship have prevailed. Instead, he blames the backward Russian people for it: “Freedom of
speech does exist, but is not supported by the people’s mentality. Its mentality is different; it is still
Soviet.”[29]
Mamontov includes himself when attempting criticism; “I censor myself at times, after all I am a Soviet
person.”[30] To illustrate this Mamontov cited a corruption scandal which erupted in 2012 around the
Minister of Defense Serdiukov and his lover Evgeniia Vasil’eva “who adored luxuries.”[31] Serdiukov’s
departure from the government was, among other things, triggered by the documentary which Mamontov
produced for his show. The documentary described the scale of corruption among Serdiukov’s close
circle. Mamontov explained: “We could have said much more about her [the lover], but we decided not
to… I was afraid that it would annoy people too much.”[32] This self-censorship, as Mamontov further
elaborated, is related to two things. First, there lacks a culture of speaking out and articulating criticism.
Second, Russian newsmakers are reluctant to say what they think for fear of unexpected consequences.
[33]
Similarly to Kiselev, Shevchenko ferociously defended his channel’s governance by claiming journalistic
and editorial freedom: “There is no self-censorship. We have a normal editorial policy. It’s not any
different to what any reporter from the Frankfurter Allgemeine or the [Austrian daily] Kurier experiences…
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If I put my money into a channel or a newspaper, why should I be forced to like everybody? This is why
there is such a thing like an editorial policy. If the state invests money in a media outlet, it has the right to
demand that the outlet follows the state’s policy.”[34]Compared to the celebrity hosts we discussed
previously, Krasovskii’s statements about censorship and self-censorship were more explicit. He
admitted that direct censorship existed at his workplace. At the same time he saw great freedom of
expression which, among other things, he ascribed to geographical factors. Whenever reporters
transgress acceptable boundaries, the time zones in Russia enable the authorities to stop such
disagreeable programs. It will simply be taken off air: “A program is first broadcast in the Far East, and
nobody watches it. First, the population there is small. Second, they are not interested and many don’t
even have a TV set. You can show them whatever you want. And if the regional or central authorities
take umbrage at a certain program, it is simply taken off air. Anyway in Irkutsk, nobody will see it.”
This distinctive feature also demonstrates the flexible nature of media control in Russia: in many ways it
does not need coercive mechanisms, whilst still affording reporters their creative freedom.
Self-censorship was, according to Krasovskii, no issue in the television projects he participated in. These
include the liberally inclined television shows NTVshniki and Tsentral’noe Televidenie. They were
notorious for their occasionally scandalous approach and attempts to report on issues which were
excluded from programs on other federal channels. However, these two shows, together with a few
others on federal television, which enjoy significant freedom to report on cutting edge issues without
being subject to censorship, are rare exceptions. In contrast to these individuals, who demonstrate solid
loyalty to the regime, most of Russia’s major free-thinking media personalities disappeared from
television screens, in the last decade, as soon as they made open and honest statements.[37] One of
Russia’s most successful political reporters, Leonid Parfenov, lost his job on NTV in 2004 because he
ignored the prohibition on reporting the war in Chechnya.[38] This was the first major act of censorship
by a federal television company owner in the 2000s. In 2010, Parfenov publicly stated that reporters had
become bureaucrats unwilling to criticize top-ranking politicians and that political journalism had
degraded into merely praising political leadership.[39] Up to now, he has remained a persona-non-grata
in political programs on state-aligned television. His political unpredictability makes him one of the most
visible examples of censorship in the history of post-Soviet television.[40] The fact that Parfenov has
been allowed to keep one film a year on Channel 1 (on Russian culture and history) is a shrewd tactic
employed by the regime; by still allowing Parfenov to appear on screen, they can claim that freedom of
information does exist. Another highly acclaimed television reporter, Vladimir Pozner, managed to keep
his programs on the state-aligned Channel 1, despite openly admitting that the head of the channel
interfered with who he was allowed to invite onto his show.[41]
Pozner and Parfenov clearly have different political positions to most of the media personalities we
talked to. One must assume that, indeed, the state exerts pressure on media personalities and reporters
whose views diverge from that of the Kremlin. However, these two individuals also illustrate clear
[35]
[36]
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differences in how they are managed by the state. Parfenov’s unpredictability caused the authorities to
remove him from political programs on state-aligned television. By contrast, the regime has come to
terms with Pozner who acquiesced with the channel’s head, Konstantin Ernst, request not to invite a
number of prominent opposition figures.[42]
This also indicates why an apparent political rebel like Shevchenko is acceptable to, if not even
welcomed by, the authorities. However provocative he appears, his statements remain within the
boundaries of the Kremlin’s agenda. Predictability and loyalty the regime can rely on are crucial to
survive on state-aligned television. These are, however, vague categories which need to be internalized
by media personalities. In contrast to well-established Western state broadcasting companies, such as
the BBC, who provide clear guidance to their staff, in Russia, reporters, pundits and anchors are
confronted with unwritten rules. The logic behind this rule of the game became most apparent in the
statements made by the rank-and-file reporters we talked to.
Rank-and-file reporters on censorship
All the other reporters we interviewed universally agreed that with regard to censorship one must not
report negatively about Vladimir Putin. The state-aligned channels hire entire teams of special reporters
to manage Putin’s news agenda, and all the channels have succumbed to this informal intervention. This
goes back to the early 2000s when the federal channels developed the image of Putin as the sole leader
of the nation. [43] If a private television channel resorts to cautious criticism, as REN TV has done
occasionally, the word ‘President’ with its close (and natural-sounding) counterpart vlast’ (‘power’ or
‘authority’) is used in its news reporting.[44]
The existence of the taboo for any critical assessment of Putin’s work tends to be accepted as fair and
right by our interviewees: “There is a clear boundary. We are not allowed to cover certain topics, as is the
practice on any channel. Just like in every family the children are not allowed access to the family
budget. There are boundaries everywhere. There is a special team who works on, with and for the
president.”[45] Apart from this taboo, the reporters we interviewed denied any censorship, arguing that,
in fact, “everything goes”.[46] They claimed not to have experienced any direct interference or any
instructions to cut out parts from reports or withdraw them. On the contrary, they insisted that their
editors and bosses do not exert the slightest hint of coercive control. This can be partly explained by
these individuals’ specific positions. Most of them have consciously distanced themselves from covering
political issues. Reporters who claim not to have experienced any direct interference, or any instructions
to cut out parts of reports or withdraw them, usually cover issues other than politics. Everything outside
of politics is less sensitive, which allows them much greater freedom.[47]
Another reason for the freedom our interviewees claimed to have enjoyed might be related to the
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previously mentioned fact that television channels need to sustain viewers’ interest in the programs. As
one of our interviewees explained, Channel 1 cannot aim solely at brainwashing viewers because their
viewers will become bored and will stop watching the channel. The need to keep viewers’ interest
ensures that the state-aligned channels keep the level of information censorship within certain limits.[48]
Censorship and self-censorship tend to risk making reports dull and boring, whereas reporter’s creativity
usually does the opposite. Views and interests of many reporters often overlap with those of their
viewers, and a reporter’s personal background and views will significantly influence the content of a
report and the slant it will take. This partly explains the appearance of shows and reports with anti-
migrant, sexist or homophobic content. As our interviewee from NTV admitted: “I don’t like migrants
[priezhzhikh], even though I myself moved here. But at least I’m not from another country… If you take
them individually, put them in a corner and talk to them, they all are good people. But if they are in
masses, they become unmanageable, they turn into bad people.”[49] In short, unless a reporter’s views
run counter to their editorial policies, they might indeed be granted great freedom in their work.
There are, no doubt, more complex mechanisms for ensuring informational discipline and loyalty among
journalists. Almost all of our interviewees identified “adekvatnost”’ literally “adequacy”, but better
translated as the right instinct combined with adroit appropriateness and a portion of wiliness – as the
main trait required for potential candidates to be hired by a federal television channel. One reporter
defined adekvatnost’ as “the ability to react appropriately to the conditions in which you find yourself.”[50]
Reporters are expected to understand the specific character of their job and avoid breaking certain
unwritten laws (which could be changed without any explicit notification). A reporter from NTV stated:
“You understand what you are allowed to do and what not. It is basically on a subconscious level that
you understand what to do… Although you can suggest whatever you like. If you present it appropriately
[adekvatno], there is no problem.”[51]
Adekvatnost’ as a reporter’s characteristic is neatly tied to self-censorship. In many cases it is
straightforward. When experts are consulted or guests invited to the studio, each reporter has their own
contacts who are selected according to the principle of adekvatnost’. As a reporter explained, “anyone
can be included in such a list. It is not a prescribed list from the Kremlin… Of course, every reporter
looks for experts who are likely to conform to the policy of the channel”.[52] However, nobody has ever
compiled an actual list of names. Instead, every reporter who is up-to-date with political developments in
the country is able to decide for him- or herself whom to include on their individual list of banned people.
This requires intervention from supervisors only in exceptional cases.
Unexpected and rapid political changes, however, can make adekvatnost’ more challenging. One
interviewee told us a story about when they had invited a writer who fell out with Putin on the very day
when the interview was scheduled to take place: “We asked ourselves: maybe we should not have him
[the writer] here anymore? And, without any instruction from above, our team decided to cancel the
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interview. Our producer gave him [the writer] some lame excuse, that some technical equipment broke
down here in the studio or something. The program is pre-recorded, so we could have actually just cut
out some bits if necessary, but we wanted to cover our backs… He [the writer] instantly wrote about it on
Twitter, and in the end we had a scandal. They invited him to another of our channel’s programs.”[53]
The need for a reporter to figure out what is ‘appropriate’ at a particular moment in time, might lead to
insecurity and an overly cautious approach. But censorship and self-censorship risk making reports dull
and boring.
Overall, however, our interviewees claimed to enjoy fairly unlimited freedom in their journalistic practice.
An NTV reporter stated that “even on federal channels you can find a compromise with your conscience.
If you are cultured and educated, you can easily find your way.”[54] One is free to propose whatever one
likes. ‘If you present it appropriately [adekvatno], there is no problem.’ The main thing is that programs
entertain the viewers and receive high ratings.[55] What helps to overcome this potential conflict is that
most reporters’ views do not run counter to their editorial policies. Once a reporter’s loyalty is proven,
they may well be granted great freedom in their work. The freedom to hold views that diverge from those
of the government usually implies that one is not involved in broadcasting political news. The rule of the
game, however, is that if a reporter is keen to report on political topics (which will involve direct promotion
of Kremlin positions), he or she will be well aware of the limitations, and will choose this path consciously
and deliberately.
Conclusion
A close look at the practices of Russian reporters, pundits, anchors, editors and managers, with regard to
self-censorship, reveal that they have developed their own sophisticated mechanisms to execute Kremlin
policies, without ever making this process too explicit. It would be wrong to assume that the images
broadcast by television were initiated by the Presidential Administration and imposed coercively onto
media personalities and reporters. In many respects television reports and talk shows reveal at least as
much, if not more, of a media personality’s or a reporter’s personal characteristics than of explicit political
pressure and interference. Our interviews with both celebrity media personalities and rank-and-file
reporters indicate that coercion is not an aspect which concerns journalism on federal television
channels. Self-censorship is euphemistically described as the adekvatnost’, a term which is vaguely
defined, but definitely seen as a virtue and expression of professionalism. All the media personalities and
reporters we interviewed showed complete understanding of this form of regulating and governing media
and information policies. Many of them hold the view that, if a media personality and reporter does not
agree with the editorial policy of one media organization, he or she is free to change to another
organization. As in Koltsova’s study of reporters working for regional channels in the mid-2000s, our
interviewees also seem to freely promote their masters’ view. In case of state-aligned channels this is the
Russian government’s. This does not require coercive mechanisms; and still affords reporters creative
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freedom. This is not to imply that all reporters are cynics, but rather that political journalists know and
understand their role in the game. Those who are happy to play, play a careful hand.
Wherever celebrity media personalities admit to “regulatory mechanisms” (usually described as editorial
policy), they refer to Western editorial practices, stating that the latter are in no way better. As in many
spheres of life, Western practices decisively legitimize Russian practices, which our interviewees
ferociously defended. In general, however, renowned media personalities, such as Mamontov and
Kiselev, deny censorship as such and argue that neither censorship nor self-censorship is the decisive
tool of media governance regulating the daily news agenda on screen. And indeed, proximity to the
decision-making centers allows them to speak freely and disseminate their ideas without being censored.
Instead, they are part of the process of news production: Being important public mouthpieces for the
Kremlin, Mamontov and Kiselev mediate the discourse produced by the Kremlin and, at the same time,
partake in its production.
The Russian political puzzle became even more complicated after 2012, as the future of the political
regime now looks much more unpredictable than at any previous time of Putin’s rule. This challenge
makes the political elite keep their eye on federal television as a main pillar of their informational power.
As our analysis shows, media personalities and reporters are ready to employ whatever means they
have to ensure stability and the maintenance of Putin’s regime. The large majority of media personalities
and reporters who work in state-aligned television seem to regard their principal role as defending the
status quo. They see themselves as important agents of ensuring stability in the country by means of
their programs. Their mission is to impose an order which stands in sharp contrast to the turbulences
and the chaos of the 1990s. The closer one is to the center of decision-making, the greater the freedom
you have to speak freely and disseminate ideas without being censored. Well-known media personalities
are part of the process of news production. Many of them perceive themselves as far more than simply
reporters, pundits or anchors: they serve the country by being media professionals, educators and
politicians all at once.
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